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Burning of fossil fuel is the main reason behind man-
made climate change. By burning the carbon content,
carbon dioxide is produced and quickly spreads in the
global atmosphere. This increases the greenhouse
effect, thereby changing the earth’s energy balance.
Concern over the negative consequences of climate
change has led to a vast array of policy measures aimed
at reducing the use of fossil fuel. This chapter examines
some aspects of these policies. It discusses the argu-
ments for taxes and quantity restrictions on CO2-emit-
ting activities, and especially on the burning of fossil
fuel, as well as policies to subsidise substitutes for these
activities, particularly the use and development of tech-
nologies producing non-fossil based “green energy”. 
Before moving on to discuss policy, the next section
describes important aspects of the production and use
of energy in the European Union.
6.2 Energy production and use in the European Union
Europe is heavily dependent on fossil fuel. Figure 6.1
shows energy consumption in the European Union by
primary source. The main prima-
ry sources are: 
￿ fossil fuels, consisting of coal
and lignite, oil and gas, 
￿ nuclear,
￿ renewables.
Figure 6.1 shows that over the
last twenty years, fossil fuel has
represented a fairly stable share
of around 80 percent of our total
energy consumption. There has
only been a modest decline over
this period: from 83 percent in
1990 to 77 percent in 2008.
Meanwhile total energy con-
sumption has increased moder-
ately over this period, by 0.4 percent per year, which is
substantially less then GDP growth over the same
period. Thus, energy efficiency, measured as GDP per
unit of energy use has increased. 
While the share of fossil energy has remained stable,
there have been some changes in its composition. The
share of coal and lignite has fallen from around
33 percent to 20 percent of fossil energy, while gas
has increased by nearly the same amount, from
21 percent to 32 percent, leaving oil to account for a
stable share of slightly below half of total fossil ener-
gy consumption.
Non-fossil energy sources as a share of energy con-
sumption have increased somewhat over the period.
Nuclear power’s share increased from 12.2 percent in
1990, peaking at 14.5 percent in 2002 and then falling
slightly to 13.4 percent. Renewables have almost dou-
bled relative to their initial share of 4.4 percent, but
remain a minor source of energy accounting for just
8.4 percent of total energy consumption in 2008.
Figure 6.2 shows the components of renewable ener-
gy over the same period of time. Biomass and wastes
increased over the period from 61 percent to 70 per-
cent of total renewable energy. The fastest growth
rate, however, occurred in wind energy, which
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ing, however, that this figure only represents 0.56 per-
cent of total energy consumption. Hydro power has
remained constant in terms of total energy provision
and has thus fallen as a share of renewable energy,
from 35 percent to 19 percent over the whole period.
Geothermal energy, on the other hand, has grown at
the same rate as renewables overall, remaining a con-
stant share of around 4 percent. Solar power has
experienced high growth, but at the end of the period
it still only accounted for 1 percent of the 8.4 percent
total for renewables. 
Finally, let us break down the biomass and wastes com-
ponent. Figure 6.3 shows that wood and wood waste is
the largest component, although other wastes, biogas
and biofuels have all increased. For example, biofuels
and biogas together account for 18 per  cent of biomass
and wastes, implying that they
represent 1.5 percent of total
energy consumption. 
Over the period renewable energy
has enjoyed substantial growth. It
has increased at an average
growth rate of 4.2 percent, while
overall energy consumption has
only grown by 0.4 percent per
year. By the laws of mathematics,
this means that the share of
renewables will continue to grow
if these trends continue. Un  -
fortunately, achieving a substan-
tial share will take a long time at
this growth rate. By extrapolating
current trends, the 20 percent tar-
get of the European Union will not be reached until
2035. To increase the share faster than this, trends have
to be broken: either via slower growth in total energy
consumption and/or via faster growth in renewable
energy production. This can surely only be achieved at
a substantial, arguably prohibitive, cost, unless policy
is constructed in a clever way. We will return to this
issue in the next section. 
Let us now turn to the composition of energy uses.
Here we focus on final energy consumption, i.e., after
transmission and conversion losses in energy producing
sectors. Figure 6.4 shows that there has been a fairly
strong decline in the share of energy consumption used
by industry. This figure fell from 35 percent to 25 per-
cent over the sample period. Most of this decrease was
balanced by an increase in transport use: from 26 per-
cent to 34 percent. The household share of energy con-
sumption remained fairly stable at
25 percent. Finally, there was a
slight increase in energy consump-
tion by the service sector and a
small decline in agriculture.
Renewable energy accounts for a
small share of energy consump-
tion in the European Union.
However, there are very large dif-
ferences between the different
member states. This is shown in
Table 6.1 where the member
states are listed from highest to
lowest share of renewable energy
at the end of the sample period.
While the overall share of renew-
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ables is 8.4 percent, Aus  tria, Finland, Latvia and
Sweden have shares of above 25 percent. Clearly, this
partly reflects the availability of natural resources.
Hydropower accounts for 36 percent and 42 percent
in Sweden and Austria,1 well above the EU average of
19 percent in renewables. At the other end of the spec-
trum are Belgium, Ireland, Cyprus, Luxem  bourg, the
United Kingdom and Malta, with shares below 4 per-
cent. Although Denmark has basically no hydropow-
er, its share of renewable energy is still above average.
This is partly because of the high share of wind
power, and partly due to a larger than average share of
biomass and wastes. Latvia has the next highest share
of renewable energy after Sweden, but below-average
shares of hydropower and practically no wind power.
Instead, it relies heavily on biomass and wastes.
Some countries have also increased their share of
renewables fairly dramatically over the 20-year period.
The countries marked green are the ten countries that
increased their share of renewable energy the most dur-
ing the period, while the ten countries with least change
appear in red. Denmark, for example, increased its
share from 6.7 to 18.1 percent, while Latvia increased
its share from 13.2 percent to 30.1 percent. Sweden,
Finland and Germany (whereby the latter two have less
hydropower energy than the EU average), have also
seen sizeable increases, as have some of the new EU-
member states like Romania and Lithuania. In con-
trast, France, Spain and Greece (all with hydropower
above the EU average) had basically no increases and
Portugal even saw its share of renewable energy
decrease. The United Kingdom experienced a very
modest increase from an initial sit-
uation that basically involved no
renewable energy at all.
It is largely the countries at the top
of the table that have changed their
shares the most. With the excep-
tion of Portugal, the ten countries
with the largest increases are also
the countries with the highest
shares. Of course, this is partly due
to the fact that countries which
increase their shares also end up
with higher shares. In a regression
of the change of renewable energy
on its initial share, the initial share
is positively associated with a sub-
sequent increase, but the coeffi-
cient is statistically insignificant. 
The European Union has committed itself to increase
the share of renewable energy in final energy consump-
tion to 20 percent by the year 2020. Individual targets
have also been set for each member country. The targets
are set up based on historical shares and on GDP and
vary substantially between countries, from 10 percent
(Malta) to 49 percent (Sweden). Also some large coun-
tries have targets substantially below the aggregate tar-
get, e.g., the United Kingdom for which the target is
15 percent. In the final column of Table 6.1 we show
how much is left of the 2020 target.2 We see that with
the exception of Sweden, Latvia, Denmark, Romania
and Estonia, more is left than what has been achieved in
the preceding two decades. 
There is a negative correlation between what remains to
the target and the share of renewable energy in 2008.
Thus, those countries that now have the lowest shares of
renewable energy are the ones expected to have the high-
est further expansion. This could reflect a sound alloca-
tion if the costs of expanding the share of renewable
energy are lowest in the countries with currently low
shares of renewable energy. However, the administrative
targets may not reflect an economically efficient alloca-
tion. In order to counter this, the European Union will
allow countries that do not achieve their targets to buy
“excess” shares from other countries. The idea behind
this is that countries in which it is cheaper to increase
the renewable energy share above the target can do so
and sell the “excess” shares to countries with higher
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1 Data for shares of renewable energy are from Eurostat and apply to
2008. 
2 Note, however, that the target variable is defined in a slightly dif-
ferent way than the figures in the first four columns of Table 6.1.may increase overall efficiency. However, the mecha-
nism requires credibility. Unless countries that plan not
to satisfy their targets believe that the cost of simply
breaking the rules are higher than paying for excess
shares, there will be no demand for excess shares. 
6.3 Energy policies for mitigating climate change and
fossil dependence
Coping with climate change poses a tremendous chal-
lenge to society. The previous section showed that the
European Union remains heavily dependent on fossil
fuel for its energy needs. Reaching the target for 2020 of
a renewable energy share of 20 percent requires an
increase about three times as large as was achieved over
the last 15 years. The magnitude of this task means that
we cannot afford to approach it with inefficient poli-
cies. Transforming our energy production and usage to
make it more climate-friendly will be a costly process,
even if implemented in an optimal way.3 Any sub-opti-
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EU-27 4.4  5.7  8.4  4.0  11.6 
EU-15 4.9  5.8  8.6  3.7  NA 
Sweden  24.9  31.6  32.1  7.2  4.6 
Latvia  13.2  31.8  30.1  16.9  10.2 
Austria  20.0  22.9  25.3  5.3  5.7 
Finland  19.0  23.8  25.2  6.2  7.5 
Denmark  6.7  10.9  18.1  11.4  11.3 
Portugal  18.7  15.3  17.8  – 1.0  8.0 
Romania  4.1  10.9  13.5  9.4  3.7 
Estonia  4.5  10.2  11.0  6.5  6.1 
Slovenia  4.6  12.3  11.0  6.4  9.9 
Lithuania  2.0  9.2  9.3  7.3  8.1 
Germany  1.6  2.8  8.6  7.0  9.1 
Italy  4.2  5.2  7.8  3.6  10.4 
Spain  7.0  5.7  7.7  0.7  9.3 
France  6.9  6.5  7.4  0.4  12.0 
Hungary  1.8  2.1  6.1  4.3  6.4 
Poland  1.6  4.2  5.7  4.1  7.2 
Slovakia  1.6  2.8  5.5  3.9  5.7 
Greece  4.9  5.0  5.0  0.1  10.1 
Czech Republic  0.2  1.5  5.0  4.8  5.8 
Bulgaria  0.6  4.2  4.9  4.3  6.7 
Netherlands  1.4  2.4  4.2  2.8  10.8 
Belgium  1.3  1.3  3.7  2.4  9.7 
Ireland  1.6  1.6  3.6  1.9  12.2 
Cyprus  0.4  1.8  3.0  2.6  8.9 
Luxembourg  1.3  1.5  2.6  1.3  8.9 
United Kingdom  0.5  1.1  2.6  2.1  12.8 
Malta  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  9.8 
World 12.8  13.2  13.0     
Africa 50.5  51.1  49.4     
Middle East  1.1  0.7  0.5     
United States  5.2  4.8  5.4     
China 24.3  20.2  12.2     
India 43.8  33.8  28.1     
Russia 3.0  3.4  3.0     
a) Targets in last column refer to renewable energy in final energy consumption. Source: Europes Energy 
portal, www.energy.eu. 
Source: Eurostat, IEA. 
3 In a recent paper, Bretschger et al. (2011) calculate the cost for
Switzerland of a policy to reduce CO2-emissions by 30 percent by the
year 2020 and by 80 percent by the year 2050. They find that the cost
is equivalent to a permanent reduction of GDP of 2.6 per  cent. ThisEEAG Report 2012 135
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mal transformation may prove too costly to be politi-
cally feasible and may perhaps incur more costs than
benefits. Despite this, there is a lack of a comprehensive
plan for the transformation of our energy systems. This
is particularly true of policies targeted at promoting so
called “green technologies”, which are often assumed
to mean renewable energy. 
Two central arguments for why governments should
intervene in the market for energy will be discussed
in this section.4 The first is that emitting CO2, by
burning fossil fuel, for instance, is a true global
externality. Emitted CO2 mixes quickly in the
atmosphere and any effect this has on the climate
and the economy is completely independent of who
is responsible for the emission and where it
occurred. Since the benefits of using the fuel that
produced the emissions are enjoyed by the emitter,
while the costs of global climate change are born by
everyone, policies to make the emitter internalise the
global costs are called for. By taxing the externality,
markets can be relied upon to lead to an efficient use
of fossil fuel. Before discussing the arguments for
policies to restrict fossil fuel use, the next subsection
looks at how such policies might affect prices and
quantities. A more detailed discussion can be found
in EEAG (2008), Chapter 5.
6.3.1 Supply of and demand for scarce resources
Any analysis of the effects of taxation and quantity
restrictions requires a full understanding of the
underlying markets. It is a well-known, but unfortu-
nately often forgotten truth that
the effects of taxing a good
depend crucially on both supply
and de  mand. 
Fossil fuel is a resource that
exists in limited supply. This
implies that the fossil fuel market has important
dynamic and forward-looking elements. A unit of
fossil fuel extracted and sold today could have been
saved to use later instead. Analysing such markets
requires fairly advanced mathematical tools like
dynamic, stochastic optimisation. However, many
key results can actually be illustrated in a simple sta-
tic model.
Let us consider the oil market based on the assump-
tion that there is a finite amount of oil in the ground.
Let us also, again only as a starting point, assume that
the extraction cost is negligible relative to the value of
oil. In the real world, the latter assumption is natural-
ly violated, but the oil reserves of Saudi-Arabia satis-
fy it reasonably well.
Figure 6.5 illustrates the situation just described. The
supply of oil is vertical at Q, which is the amount
existing in the ground. When interpreting this as rep-
resenting the oil market, we should think of this sup-
ply curve as representing the supply aggregated over
all future time periods, rather than as the supply dur-
ing an individual year. 
The downward sloping line D1 represents demand at
the outset. The price is P1 and the quantity Q. Now
consider the effect of introducing a tax τ on oil (or,
equivalently, on the by-product of using it – CO2). At
every market price excluding the tax, the demanded
quantity is now lower. We can illustrate this as a shift
downwards in the demand curve, where the shift
downward is equal to the value of the tax. The new
equilibrium is a price P2 that has the property that
τ
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figure is in line with Grubb et al. (2006)
who compare different estimates of the
global cost of limiting climate change to
tolerable levels. Their conclusion is that
the cost is “unlikely to exceed one year’s
foregone economic growth”. These figures
indicate large yet arguably manageable
costs, but they rely on policies being cho-
sen in an optimal way.
4 Another argument, which is not dealt
with in this chapter, is that energy systems
often feature increasing returns to scale
and network externalities. Thus, the pro-
duction and/or delivery may be so called
natural monopolies or feature very few
suppliers, in which case it is well known
that regulation may be needed to ensure
economic efficiency.P2 + τ = P1. The quantity remains at Q. As we see, the
price has fallen exactly as much as the tax, and the
quantity has not changed. 
In a dynamic model with the same features, it is
straightforward to show that if a constant tax rate is
introduced in every period, we obtain the same result
as in the static example. Nothing happens to quanti-
ties and the price falls in every period by a percentage
amount equal to the tax rate. By deviating from the
constant tax rate, the extraction path may be affected,
but not the overall amount extracted. For example, a
tax rate that falls over time induces resource owners to
postpone extraction, i.e., to extract less today and
more in the future.5
We can also analyse the effects of policies to reduce
demand. Such policies can come in different forms.
One such form is a unilateral policy that reduces
demand in some, but not all, oil consuming coun-
tries. Such a policy would shift demand inwards,
resulting in a new, lower price. At this lower price,
the additional demand from other countries exactly
off-sets the reduction in demand in the countries
that introduced the policy. The policy would then
have no aggregate effect. This finding that reduc-
tions in resource use in one region leads to an
increase in other regions is sometimes called “leak-
age”. In the case of an inelastic supply, we find
complete leakage. Below we discuss a situation in
which there is partial, but not complete leakage.
A result related to leakage occurs if non-fossil tech-
nologies for energy production
are introduced. The effects of
such policies can be analysed as
a leftward shift in demand lead-
ing to a lower price, but no
change in quantity. A striking
variant of this argument is the
so-called “Green Para  dox”, a
term first coined by Hans-
Werner Sinn in his book of the
same title (Sinn 2012). Let us
assume that an alternative technology will replace
fossil fuel at some point in the future. Let us suppose,
furthermore, that this point is brought forward in
time, thanks to a subsidised R&D program, for
example. Thinking of the graph as representing sup-
ply and demand per period, we now have more oil
per period to spend before the alternative becomes
available – supply is shifted outward. Therefore, the
price falls and extraction is accelerated.
So far we have discussed oil. The major threat to the
climate is, however, not oil, at least not traditional,
low extraction cost oil, but coal. BP (2010) reports
that globally proved reserves of oil total 181.7 giga-
tons. If this was the only fossil fuel to be burnt, cli-
mate change would not be a worry. Adding this
amount of CO2 to the atmosphere would, according
to standard estimates of climate sensitivity, be likely
to lead to additional heating of well below one
degree Celsius. However, there are large amounts of
coal and other sources of fossil fuel that typically are
fairly expensive to extract. Rogner (1997) estimates
global reserves taking into account technical
progress and ends up with an estimate of over 5,000
gigatons of oil equivalents. Burning even a small
share of this reserve will most certainly be detrimen-
tal for the climate.
With coal and non-traditional oil resources it is less
reasonable to neglect extraction costs. IEA (2010)
reports the average cost of producing coal at 43 US
dollars per ton, while the average coal price
2005–2009 was 74 US dollars.6
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5 However, Hassler and Krusell (2011)
recently showed that such a tax has both
income effects and substitution effects.
Under reasonable assumptions regarding
preferences and technology, these effects
can cancel each other out unless tax
receipts are transferred to the resource
owners (oil exporters). Taxing oil and giv-
ing the proceeds to citizens of oil consum-
ing countries then has no effect on the
path of extraction, regardless of whether
the tax is time-variant or not.
6 US Central Appalachian coal, see BP
(2010).EEAG Report 2012 137
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Figure 6.6 illustrates an upward-sloping supply sched-
ule for fossil fuel representing the case whereby more
aggregate use requires the extraction of more costly
resources. The interpretation of the figure is that the
equilibrium determines how much fossil fuel will be
used in total. If demand is given by D1, the total
extracted volume will be Q1. Reserves with higher costs
will not be used, at least not as fuel. We see in the fig-
ure that taxes and demand reductions now have an
effect both on prices and quantities. A shift in the
demand curve, regardless of the reason for the shift,
affects the price as well as the quantity. In this case,
unilateral demand reductions will lead to some leak-
age, but this will not be complete. The “Green
Paradox” will also be partly mitigated. The last unit
extracted before the alternative technology takes over
will have an extraction cost equal to its price. Reducing
the time until the alternative fossil free technology
becomes available leads to a reduction in the fossil fuel
price. This has an effect on the total quantity extract-
ed, but also speeds up extraction. A likely outcome is
therefore higher emissions, but for a shorter period of
time so that total emissions aggregated over time fall.
The conclusion of this section is that measures to
reduce demand may be ineffective or even counter-
productive. To analyse their effects, we need to model
both supply and demand. Unfortunately and surpris-
ingly, this point has been almost absent from policy
discussion to date. We therefore currently have no
clear indications as to the effects of policies like CO2-
taxes and emission quotas, in particular not of unilat-
eral policies introduced by the European Union. It
has so far been impossible to reach internationally
binding agreements on CO2-reductions with wide cov-
erage. Some positive signs have recently been seen,
particularly the agreements reached during the United
Nations Climate Change Conference in Durban in
2011, which may lead to agreements with more sub-
stantial effects on global CO2-emissions. 
6.3.2 The size of the climate externality
Great uncertainty surrounds the cost of emitting CO2.
We simply do not know the exact dynamic mapping
from CO2-emissions to climate change. Similarly, we
do not know exactly which costs climate change will
generate in the short or in the long run.
There are also several conceptual issues which do not
have scientific answers, but require value judgments.
Among them is the issue of how to compare costs and
benefits accruing to different individuals living in dif-
ferent time periods or in different countries. Since the
costs of climate change, as well as that of policies to
mitigate or adapt to climate change, are unevenly
spread over the world and over time, any aggregate
number for the social costs of global warming explic-
itly or implicitly relies on how these interpersonal
comparisons are performed. 
It is an inescapable fact that we do not and will not fully
know the consequences of continuing to burn fossil
fuel, or those of using alternative technologies to pro-
duce energy. Despite this, decisions must be taken and
these decisions should be based on the best knowledge
available and with value judgments stated explicitly. 
Fortunately, the number of studies on the social costs
of emitting CO2 is growing. Of course, these studies
arrive at different numbers, but in total, they imply
that we have valuable, albeit limited knowledge on
which to base our calculations. Tol (2008) summaris-
es the result of 211 estimates of the social costs of car-
bon emissions. Using the half of the sample that was
published in peer-reviewed scientific journals, he finds
that the mean of the estimates lies between 49 US dol-
lars and 71 US dollars, depending on the aggregation
method used.7 The standard deviation is large and
amounts to around two to four times the mean.
Expressing these numbers in euros/tonCO2 we arrive
at values of between 10 and 14.8
There are many differences responsible for the differ-
ent results in terms of the costs. However, as shown in
Golosov et al. (2011), three separate factors are the
key determinants of the social cost of emitting car-
bon, namely:
￿ How long CO2 is staying in the atmosphere.
￿ How much damage a given CO2-concentration
causes.
￿ How the welfare of future generations is dis  -
counted. 
The first factor is largely determined by what is called
carbon circulation, i.e., how carbon circulates
between the atmosphere, the biosphere and the
oceans. A good approximation of this according to
IPCC (2007) and Archer (2005) is that a share of
around 50 percent is absorbed quickly (within a few
7 These numbers represent the purchasing power of US dollars in
1995. 
8 The mole weights of carbon and oxygen are 12 and 16, respective-
ly. To get the cost per mass unit of carbon from the cost per mass
unit of CO2, we therefore need to multiply by (2*16+12)/12=3.67.decades) by plants and the upper layers of the oceans.
One quarter stays for thousands of years while the
remainder decays slowly, with a half-life of a few hun-
dred years. 
The second factor depends both on climate sensitivi-
ty, i.e., how much climate change is caused by a
change in CO2-concentrations, and how sensitive the
economy is to climate change. It is a well-established
fact that the direct greenhouse effect can be reliably
approximated by a logarithmic function.9 A typical
result from complicated climate models is that a dou-
bling in CO2-concentrations leads to an increase of
around three degrees Celsius in the global mean tem-
perature. Given the logarithmic relationship, a qua-
drupling of the CO2-concentration would then lead to
an increase of six degrees. It is important to note that
this means that a marginal increase in CO2-concentra-
tion has a smaller impact on the temperature the high-
er the current CO2-concentration. 
The most comprehensive quantitative investigation of
the sensitivity of the economy to climate change to
date is provided by Nordhaus (2008). Nordhaus find-
ings imply that a marginal temperature rise has larger
negative effects on the economy the higher the global
mean temperature is. This finding, combined with the
findings of the natural science literature mentioned
above, implies that the marginal damage of a unit of
emitted CO2 is largely independent of how much has
already been emitted.10 This simplifies the calculation
of marginal climate externalities substantially. Using
these results, Golosov et al. (2011) show that the mar-
ginal externality cost can be calculated with a very
simple formula. The optimal tax in period t is:
The left-hand side is the tax per unit of emitted fossil
carbon. On the right-hand side, Yt is global GDP in
period  t,  Et indicates that what comes after in the
expression may be uncertain and the expected values
of these uncertain values should be used. ρ is the sub-
jective discount rate,11 d(s) is the amount of a mar-
ginal unit of emitted carbon that has left the atmos-
phere after s periods and γ measures the strength of
the damage caused by climate change. As we see, new
information about how long carbon stays in the
atmosphere, how sensitive temperature is to CO2-
emissions or how much damage we should expect
from a given temperature change can easily be incor-
porated into the formula by changing γ and the struc-
ture of d(s). 
Given a value of the externality, an optimal policy is
easily devised. The conceptually simplest policy is to
introduce a tax on emitted fossil carbon equal to the
climate externality. As is seen in the formula, the
externality is proportional to current global GDP.
Therefore, as long as no new information about car-
bon circulation or damages arrives, the tax per unit of
emitted carbon should follow the development of
world GDP. A tax equal to the externality is not the
only possible optimal policy. An alternative is quan-
tity restrictions, for example, by introducing a fixed
number of emissions permits. The amount of such
permits should then be set so that the price of the
permit equals the climate externality. If more evi-
dence emerges regarding the existence of so-called
tipping points, where the climate becomes very sensi-
tive to additional emission, the case for using emis-
sion permits rather than taxes is strengthened since
such a policy may make the emission volume easier to
control.
Calibrating  γ to the work on damages done by
Nordhaus (2008) and d(s) to recent work on the car-
bon circulation, Golosov et al. (2011) compute the cli-
mate externality per ton of fossil carbon emitted in
the atmosphere as a function of the subjective dis-
count rate ρ. The results, expressed in euros per ton of
emitted fossil CO2 are shown in Figure 6.7. On the 
x-axis different values of the subjective discount rate
ranging from 0.1 percent per year to 3.4 percent per
year are represented. 
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9 Feedback mechanisms are very important for the total effect. See
footnote 9.
10 There is certainly a great deal of uncertainty surrounding the
assumptions behind this finding. More specifically, it is well known
that the climate system has many non-linearities due to feed-back
mechanisms. Examples include the melting of ice in the Arctic,
Antarctica and Greenland. Since ice reflects sunlight better than sea
water and ground, melting reinforces an initial increase in tempera-
ture. Such non-linearities can even be strong enough to induce local-
ly unstable dynamics. At some point, a minimal direct disturbance to
the system then leads to a large discrete change. Such “tipping
points” are analysed in Lenton et al. (2008) who find that, according
to current knowledge, melting of ice on Greenland and in the Arctic
are the most worrisome tipping points. If a consensus on such tip-
ping points arises, the argument for limiting the temperature increase
to levels below them is strengthened. Furthermore, it would make the
social costs of carbon depend on current and expected future stocks
of atmospheric CO2, invalidating the simple formula for the tax
described in the main text.
11 Note that this measures how much we prefer to consume at earli-
er dates all else equal. It therefore compares the value of consuming
equal amounts at different dates. The market discount (interest) rate,
on the other hand, measures the value at actual consumption levels.
When the economy and consumption grows, the market interest rate
is higher than ρ since the future value of consumption is discounted
for two reasons: the subjective time-preference captured by ρ and
since the value of a marginal unit of consumption is lower when con-




The optimal CO2-tax 
 
This box describes in some detail the equation determining the formula for the optimal CO2-tax given in the text. The formula rests on 
strong simplifying assumptions and should be considered as a back-of-the-envelope calculation. Nevertheless, it transparently demon-
strates key considerations behind the calculation of the social cost of carbon emissions. Details can be found in Golosov et al. (2011). 
 
Firstly, consider how to model climate damages. A typical way to do this is to assume that we can associate a given increase in the global 






where T is the increase in the global mean temperature and ߠ is a parameter capturing the strength of the damage effect. Secondly, assume 
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Here, St is the amount of atmospheric carbon at time t. S0 is the preindustrial atmospheric carbon content and ߣ is the so called climate 
sensitivity. The latter quantifies how much heating we get from a doubling of the carbon content. A typical value is three degrees Celsius. 
Combining the two equations above, we can write the proportional damage as a function of the carbon content ܦሺܶሺܵሻሻ. Golosov et al. 
(2011) show that this mapping is close to linear for reasonable parameters. This comes from the combination of D(T) being convex and 
T(S) concave. Thus, an increase in the amount of carbon in the atmosphere by one unit has a constant proportional effect on world GDP. 
Let us denote that constant with the letter J

The next consideration is the carbon cycle. When CO2 is emitted into the atmosphere, it enters a circulation system, where carbon flows 
between the biosphere, the atmosphere and the oceans. IPCC (2007) concludes that: "About half of a CO΍ pulse to the atmosphere is 
removed over a timescale of 30 years; a further 30 percent is removed within a few centuries; and the remaining 20 percent will typically 
stay in the atmosphere for many thousands of years" while Archer (2005) concludes that a good approximation is that 75 percent of an 
excess atmospheric carbon concentration has a mean lifetime of 300 years and the remaining 25 percent stays forever. This can be repre-
sented by a linear deprecation structure d(s). The value d(s) describes how large a share of an emitted unit of carbon has left the atmos-
phere after s periods. 
 
The output loss of a unit of carbon emitted in time period t incurred s  0 periods ahead can now be expressed as (d(s)JYt+s. The first 
term, (d(s)), captures how much of the emitted carbon is left in the atmosphere after s periods. Jdenotes the damage share caused by a 
marginal unit of carbon and Yt+s is output at date t+s. 
 
We can now easily price the damage by expressing the present discounted value of damages caused by a unit of carbon emitted at  
period t. Allowing for uncertainty, this equals: 
ܧ௧ ෍ܴ௧





where Et denotes mathematical expectations at time t and Rt
t+s is the discount factor to be applied between period t and t+s.  
 











where ݑԢሺܥሻis the marginal utility of consumption and U is the subjective discount factor. Finally, let us assume that utility is logarithmic 
and that consumption is a constant fraction V of output, then ݑԢሺܥ௧ା௦ሻ ൌ ሺߪܻ ௧ା௦ሻିଵ. Using this in the expression for the present discounted 
value of marginal damages yields: 
 










Plugging values for the depreciation structure (the d(s)’s), Jand current world output for Yt we arrive at an expression that only depends 
on the subjective discount rate. The result is depicted in Figure 6.7. 
 
As we can see, future output does not enter into the formula for Wt. This is important and the intuition is straightforward. Let us suppose 
that future output goes up in some period. In that case, since damages ceteris paribus are proportional to output, damages measured in 
output in that period increase. However, with increased output, consumption also increases and this reduces the relative value of con-
sumption at that date. These two effects exactly cancel out, leaving the present discounted value of damages constant. 
 
Finally, we should note that the formula relies on strong simplifications. The consequences of relaxing the simplifications in the economic 
model are fairly well known. Moving away from logarithmic utility implies that future growth rates are no longer neutral with respect to 
the tax rate. With higher risk aversion, a higher growth rate leads to faster falling marginal utilities and thus lower optimal tax rates, for 
example. Distributional issues may also be important and the absence of a possibility to compensate particularly hard-hit regions may lead 
to a stronger need for mitigation and higher taxes (see e.g., Hassler and Krusell 2011). The point of arguably the greatest importance is 
that stronger convexities in the mapping from temperature to damages may imply that optimal taxes depend on expected future emission 
paths and thus also on technology and fossil fuel availability (cf. also footnote 9). As we can see in the figure, the value of the climate
externality and thus of the optimal tax, is sensitive to
the value of the discount rate. This is easy to under-
stand: much of a unit of emitted carbon stays in the
atmosphere and causes potential damage for a very
long time. The way we discount this future damage
therefore strongly impacts the valuation of the stream
of damage. For example, we see that if the discount
rate is 1.5 percent per year, the optimal tax is 11 euros/
tonCO2. With a discount rate as low as 0.1 percent per
year, the optimal tax is close to 100 euros/ tonCO2.
Currently, fossil fuel is taxed at quite different rates
depending on who uses it. Gasoline for private use is
typically the most heavily taxed. In addition to VAT,
the average additional tax on
gasoline is 0.53 euros/liter. The
lowest tax is applied in Cyprus
at 0.35 euros/liter. and the high-
est is levied in the Netherlands
at 0.75 euros/liter. Ex  pressing
these numbers as a tax on CO2-
emissions12 yields the following
numbers: the average tax is
227 euros/tonCO2, while in
Cyprus and the Nether  lands the
corresponding figures are 150
and 322. Of course, gasoline
taxes have other purposes too
like paying for roads, for exam-
ple, but it is instructive to make
this comparison. 
The European Union introduced
an emission trading system in
2005. The system covers about
half of the CO2 emissions in the
European Union and requires
covered emitters to keep track of
their emissions and annually
deliver emission rights to the gov-
ernment that equal their accumu-
lated emissions. Since these emis-
sion rights are traded on ex  -
changes, daily market prices can
easily be observed.13 The market
price of emission rights has var-
ied substantially since the intro-
duction of the system. During
the first year, it ranged between 20–30 euros/tonCO2.
During the financial crisis, it fell dramatically and
subsequently recovered during 2009 to a level of
around 15 euros/tonCO2. Lately the price has fallen
somewhat to a level of just above 10 euros/tonCO2.
The variability in emission prices is worrisome and
may indicate that variability in demand for emission
rights (fossil fuel) varies and that the elasticity of
demand is low. A possible explanation for this is that
industry demand for energy is very inelastic in the
short run. In fact, energy is needed in quite fixed pro-
portions to industrial output in the short run. A busi-
ness cycle upturn may then increase the demand for
energy and fossil fuel, causing a steep rise in the price
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12 A liter of gasoline contains around
0.63 kg of carbon producing about 2.33 kg
of CO2.
13 See, e.g., http://www.eex.com, the web
page of the European Energy Exchange.EEAG Report 2012 141
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of emission rights. Such business cycle variability is
likely to be inefficient since the social costs of carbon
are not sensitive to short run business cycle fluctua-
tions. In fact, a low elasticity of demand for emission
rights indicates that quantity restrictions of a cap-and-
trade type have disadvantages relative to CO2-taxes.
Regardless of whether policy is formulated in terms
of setting quantities (cap-and-trade) or prices (CO2-
taxes), we cannot trust that the policy formulation is
exactly correct. However, the consequences of such
mistakes are not necessarily independent of the type
of policy used. This is illustrated in Figure 6.8. In
the two upper panels we study the consequences of
policy mistakes when the demand for emission
rights is inelastic. The downward sloping curve rep-
resents demand for emission rights and the upward
sloping curve is the marginal social externality cost.
The welfare maximising output is reached where the
two curves cross and if the curves and policy are set
optimally, this can be achieved either by allowing
the right quantity of emission rights or using the
right tax. 
Let us now consider mistakes in policy. In the upper
left panel, we consider two sub-optimal quantity
restrictions indicated by the vertical dashed lines. One
restriction is set too low and one too high. The social
loss induced by such mistakes is given by the shaded
area between the demand curve and the social cost
curve. Let us now instead consider policy mistakes
when taxes are used. For illustrative purposes, we take
the size of the mistake to be the same. The two dashed
horizontal lines indicate an excessively high and an
excessively low tax respectively. Again, the welfare
loss is the area between the two curves, which is shad-
ed in the graphs. As we can see, the shaded areas are
much smaller in the case where taxes are used as the
policy instrument.
In the two lower panels, we repeat the experiment, but
now assume that the elasticity is high. In this case, we
see that our conclusions are reversed. Quantity
restrictions lead to much smaller welfare losses. A
similar exercise can be performed by changing the
elasticity of the marginal social externality. In fact,
our reasoning above indicates that the marginal social
externality is close to constant, in which case the argu-
ments above are strengthened. However, we need to
reiterate that if more evidence on tipping points accu-
mulates, this conclusion can be reversed. With strong
tipping points, the marginal social externality is very
sensitive to whether a marginal unit of emissions can
push the climate system over the tipping point. In
such a case, quantity restrictions on emissions seem to
be the more appropriate policy instrument.
A small number of countries in the European Union
have introduced CO2-taxes on final consumers. In
Sweden, this tax is approximately 100 euros/tonCO2.
Finland, Denmark and Ireland have also introduced
CO2 taxes. Last year, the European commission pro-
posed the introduction of a uniform European CO2-
tax of 20 euros/tonCO2. The proposal is that if this
tax is introduced, other energy taxes should not be
discriminatory against any particular source of ener-
gy, but should only be based on energy content.
Let us finally discuss the issue of which discount rate
to use. Here, one can use two lines of reasoning. The
first is to use market data, for example, interest rates
and average returns on shares. As noted in foot-
note 10, these market rates are not the same as the
subjective discount rates. Given a subjective discount
rate, the market interest rate increases in line with eco-
nomic growth. This reflects the fact that postponing
consumption to a later date is worth less if consump-
tion growth is high. Thus, market rates have to be
adjusted by subtracting the effect of growth.14
Furthermore, insofar as risky market returns are used,
a proper risk adjustment must be carried out. Doing
these adjustments, typical estimates of ρ are in the
range of 1–2 percent per year. This approach is advo-
cated by Nordhaus (2008), for example.
A completely different approach is to argue that we
cannot use market data to find proper values of the
subjective discount rate. Instead moral judgments
must be used, and these cannot justify such a high dis-
count rate as is usually extracted from the market.
This approach is proposed by the Stern report (Stern
2007), for example, which arrives at a discount rate of
only 0.1 percent per year. Stern’s argumentation that
we need to make moral judgments when it comes to
valuing the effects on future generation has a clear
appeal. However, one should note that if policies are
to be based on a discount rate that is much lower than
the rate that seems to exist in the market, interven-
tions outside the area of climate policy may also be
required. To the extent that capital accumulation is
decided by market forces, savings and investment sub-
sidies may be called for if the market discount rate is
deemed to be too high.
14 One can show that the market interest rate is equal to ρ + σg,
where σ is the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution
and g is the growth rate of consumption. A widely-used assumption
is that σ = 1 (logarithmic utility).Although we appreciate that it may be possible to
argue that we should use discount rates lower than the
1–2 percent that can be extracted from markets, we do
believe that reasonable values for ρ are spanned by the
x-axis in Figure 6.7. Given current knowledge of the
consequences of global warming, it is then hard to
argue that CO2-taxes should be lower than
10 euros/tonCO2 or higher than 100 euros/tonCO2.
Although this is a wide range, we can easily rule out
several existing tax schemes as being too high and
some as too low (particularly outside the European
Union). It is also worth noting that in the calculations,
we have not at all touched upon the fact that the
European Union is only a small part of the world, par-
ticularly when it comes to CO2-emissions. Existing
studies do show that Europe may belong to a group of
regions that are harder hit by climate change than oth-
ers (like, for example, China and the United States).
However, the externality costs calculated above are
global and the cost of European emissions will largely
fall on other regions. Perhaps more importantly, our
calculations have not taken into account the fact that
supply factors are critical to an understanding of the
effect of taxes. Specifically, a unilateral introduction of
a tax reduces demand and will lower world market
prices. This increases the use of fossil fuels in the parts
of the world that have not introduced the tax. Under
some circumstances, this implies that a unilateral tax
only shifts the use of fossil fuel from tax countries to
the other countries, without affecting total use at all.
This distorts world production and consumption with-
out having any effect on the climate. This is the leak-
age problem discussed above.15 
6.3.3 The size of learning externalities
The second argument for why governments should
intervene in the market for energy is that the develop-
ment of new technologies may suffer from market
failures since the benefits of improving technologies
are seldom or never fully born by the developer of
superior technologies. Relying fully on patents to pro-
vide incentives to develop better technologies may,
particularly in the case of green technologies, be prob-
lematic or even counterproductive, since patents lead
to high prices and less use of the improved technolo-
gy. It may also be argued that in some cases, there are
substantial amounts of non-propitiatory learning-by-
doing that do not only benefit the doer. Some of the
green technologies may arguably be in an early phase
of development where such an external learning curve
is particularly steep.
It is clear that these two arguments in favour of poli-
cies to promote green technologies are logical and rest
on sound economic theory. However, they cannot be
used to justify all policies favouring green technolo-
gies. In particular, emitting one unit of CO2 has a cost
that is independent of how it was emitted. Conse  -
quently, reducing emissions by one unit has the same
value regardless of how it is achieved. This value is
certainly not fully known, but this does not change
the argument that policies that work by putting a
price on emissions should be neutral with respect to
the way emissions are reduced. Such a “law of one
price” is of key importance for economic efficiency,
but is widely violated, as we will show below. 
The argument that learning-by-doing externalities
exist in some green technologies is a quantitative argu-
ment. It is clear that learning externalities are differ-
ent for different technologies. The maturity of the
technologies is a key factor behind differences in the
size of the learning externality. In young technologies,
there is more to be learnt than in old. Box 6.2 shows a
simple quantitative example of how large subsidies for
various green technologies can be motivated with
learning externalities. Table 6.2 uses the IEA’s esti-
mates of learning rates for different technologies to
produce green electric power. The learning rate is
defined as the cost reduction implied by a doubling of
the installed capacity. This learning rate is highest for
photovoltaic solar power (17 percent), but is negligi-
ble for hydropower. It is reasonable to assume that
part of these cost reductions are externalities. When
one firm produces solar panels, the knowledge
acquired cannot be completely appropriated by the
individual firm. Instead, parts of the knowledge are
dissipated to the industry as a whole. Thus, the incen-
tive to accumulate such knowledge is weakened, cre-
ating a cause for government intervention such as
subsidies.
Table 6.2 shows the value of learning for different val-
ues of learning rates and installed stocks of capacity.
These values should be taken as upper bounds on the
learning externality that would occur only in the
hypothetical case when production is undertaken by a
large number of producers, each so small that it has a
negligible effect on total learning. In that case, a sub-
sidy to investments represented by the numbers in the
table can be justified. In reality, it is of course the case
that many of the firms producing the different tech-
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nologies are large enough to take into account their
own effect on the learning curve. For example, the
international wind turbine market is dominated by
only a few manufacturers. There  fore, the entries in the
table are upper bounds on reasonable values of sub-
sidisation. Never  theless, the numbers in Table 6.2 are
not very high. 
Only in the case of photovoltaic solar power very
early in the learning phase, is the upper bound on
subsidy rates above one third.
Needless to say, our calculations
should only be taken as a back-
of-envelope attempt to judge
what are reasonable ranges for
subsidies based on the argument
of learning externalities. Fur  -
thermore, they assume that
introduction of the new technol-
ogy is warranted, which is of
course not necessarily the case.
Instead, the cost of power gen-
eration, taking into account the
learning externality must be
compared across different production technologies
and the cheapest should be chosen. Since there is
learning, the currently cheapest technology is not
necessarily the one with the lowest costs when learn-
ing rates are taken into account. However, there are
quantitative limits to this argument: even with the
most generous assumptions on learning rates, like
for photovoltaic electricity early in the development
phase, current costs of more than twice the cost of
the cheapest technology should not be accepted.
 
Box 6.2 
Learning externalities and optimal subsidies 
 
In IEA (2010) estimates of learning rates are provided. These learning rates are defined as the percentage reduction in investment 
costs that occur as the installed capacity doubles. If the learning rate is 7 percent (as is estimated for onshore wind), a doubling of 
the installed capacity reduces the cost by 7 percent while a quadrupling leads to 14 percent cost reductions. 
 
Given a learning rate G, we can write the investment cost at time t as a function of accumulated installed capacity at t, denoted Xt. Then, 
the cost function can be written 
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where ݌ሺܺ଴ሻ is the cost at some initial date 0 and G is the learning rate. Letting xt be the investment rate at time t and r be a 
constant discount rate, the total discounted value of all future investment costs, given current (period t) accumulated installed 
capacity is then: 
 
ܲሺܺ௧ሻ ൌ ׬ ݁ି௥ሺ௦ି௧ሻ ஶ
௧ ݌ሺܺ௦ሻݔ௦݀ݏ, 
 
where ܺ௧ ൌ ܺ଴ ൅ ׬ ݔ௦݀ݏ
௧
଴ . Let us now consider a constant investment flow x normalised to unity and normalise݌ሺܺ଴ሻ ൌͳ Ǥ Then 
the normalised discounted value of future investment costs at time 0 is: 
 








We can now easily calculate how much ܲ ௡ሺܺ଴ሻ falls for a marginal unit of extra investment at time 0 for different values of the 
learning rate. This value depends on the initial stock of installed capacity. This is easy to understand: a given rate of investment has a 
larger relative impact on the accumulated stock of capacity the smaller the latter is. Thus, the learning externality is larger, the small-
er the stock of installed capacity is. In Table 6.2 the marginal reduction in ܲ ௡ሺܺ଴ሻ of a unit of extra investment at time zero is pre-
sented for different learning rates and for different stocks of accumulated capacity. The discount rate is set to 4 percent and the 
learning rates are taken from IEA (2010, Table 10.1). The numbers in the table represent the discounted value of the cost reduction a 
unit of investment causes relative to the cost of the investment. Take, for example, solar photovoltaic learning rates, which are esti-
mated at 17 percent per doubling of installed capacity. When the stock of installed capacity is equal to one year of investments, the 
value of the incurred cost reduction is 50.8 percent of the installation cost. After five years, the reduction has fallen to 31.6 percent. 
This is discussed in the main text. These numbers can be taken as upper bounds for the learning externalities. 
 
Table 6.2 
Cost reductions of future investments due to learning externalities  
in % of current investment costs 
 
Learning rate 
Installed capacity in terms of years of 
investment flow 
1 5  10  20 
Hydro, δ =0.01   4.0 2.1 1.5 1.0 
Biomass, δ =0.05  18.4  10.3 7.4 4.9 
Onshore wind δ =0.07  24.8 14.2 10.2  6.9 
Offshore wind, δ =0.09  30.8 17.9 13.0  8.8 
Geothermal, δ =0.05  18.4  10.3 7.4 4.9 
Solar photovoltaic, δ =0.17  50.8 31.6 23.5 16.3 
Concentrated solar, δ =0.10  33.7 19.8 14.3  9.7 
Source: IEA (2010) for learning rates and own calculations. Instead, however, policy in many countries has been
based on the principle that the costlier a particular
technology is, the heavier it should be subsidised.
This is absurd and inefficient. 
Table 6.3 shows current feed-in tariffs in EU coun-
tries. These tariffs are what local small producers,
typically households, receive if they produce electric-
ity and “feed” it back to the electricity grid. The tar-
iffs are typically fixed over long-horizons so as to
guarantee the return to investing in a technology that
would not be profitable without the subsidy. The tar-
iffs are very high, in many cases around 0.50 euros
per kWh. As a comparison, the average production
cost of wind power in the European Union is
0.06 euros per kWh (see EEA (2009), Table 6.7). The
large sums spent on the subsidies implied by the high
feed-in tariffs are, in the best of cases, simply a waste.
However, they may very well also be directly counter-
productive (Sinn 2012).
6.4 Conclusions
Let us now summarise the conclusions that can be
drawn from this chapter in bullet form.
￿ Europe is heavily dependent on fossil fuel. Over the
last two decades energy consumption has been
roughly constant. The share of fossil fuel has been
roughly constant at a high 80 percent with only a
modest decline from 83 percent in 1990 to 77 per-
cent in 2008. The share of energy generated by
renewable sources has increased at a fairly high
rate, almost doubling from 4.4 to 8.4 percent. If
these trends continue, however, the EU target of
20 percent renewable energy by the year 2020 will
not be reached until 2035.
￿ Targets regarding the share of renewable energy
production set for individual member countries
cannot be expected to ensure an efficient alloca-
tion. The rule that individual countries can sell
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Table 6.3 







photovoltaic  Biomass  Hydro 
Austria  0.073  0.073  0.29–0.46  0.06–0.16  n/a 
Bulgaria  0.07–0.09  0.07–0.09  0.34–0.38  0.08–0.10  0.045 
Cyprus  0.166  0.166  0.34  0.135  n/a 
Czech Republic  0.108  0.108  0.455  0.077–0.103  0.081 
Denmark  0.035  n/a  n/a  0.039  n/a 
Estonia  0.051  0.051  0.051  0.051  0.051 
France  0.082  0.31–0.58  n/a  0.125  0.06 
Germany  0.05–0.09  0.13–0.15  0.29–0.55  0.08–0.12  0.04–0.13 
Greece  0.07–0.09  0.07–0.09  0.55  0.07–0.08  0.07–0.08 
Hungary  n/a  n/a  0.097  n/a  0.029–0.052 
Ireland  0.059  0.059  n/a  0.072  0.072 
Italy  0.3  0.3  0.36–0.44  0.2–0.3  0.22 
Latvia  0.11  0.11  n/a  n/a  n/a 
Lithuania  0.10  0.10  n/a  0.08  0.07 
Luxembourg  0.08–0.10  0.08–0.10  0.28–0.56  0.103–0.128  0.079–0.103 
Malta  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a 
Netherlands  0.118  0.186  0.459–0.583  0.115–0.177  0.073–0.125 
Poland  n/a  n/a  n/a  0.038  n/a 
Portugal  0.074  0.074  0.31–0.45  0.1–0.11  0.075 
Slovakia  0.05–0.09  0.05–0.09  0.27  0.072–0.10  0.066–0.10 
Slovenia  0.087–0.094  0.087–0.095  0.267–0.414  0.074–0.224  0.077–0.105 
Spain  0.073  0.073  0.32–0.34  0.107–0.158  0.077 
United Kingdom  0.31  n/a  0.42  0.12  0.23 
Source: Europe’s Energy Portal, http://www.energy.eu/, last accessed: October 18, 2011. 
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excess renewable shares to countries that have not
achieved their targets is good, but lacks credibility. 
￿ It is not at all clear that a policy to reduce fossil
fuel use unilaterally in the European Union has
any effect at all on global emissions. By reducing
demand in Europe, world market prices may fall,
spurring higher use in other parts of the world.
Gaining a better understanding of such leakage
effects should be a top priority, along with finding
ways of reaching binding agreements on mitigation
policies with wide international coverage. 
￿ Provided that demand reductions in the European
Union have positive effects on global emissions,
the CO2 trading system is a way of efficiently allo-
cating CO2-reductions. However, there may be rea-
sons to consider a mechanism to stabilise prices. If
the prices of permits are not in line with reasonable
estimates of the social cost of carbon, volumes
should be changed. The current rule that the owner
of an emission right is allowed to save the right and
use it at any later point is appropriate and may help
to stabilise prices by increasing the demand for
emission rights during business cycle downturns,
for example, when fuel demand is low and may also
increase the supply of emission rights when fuel
demand is high. 
￿ Based on current knowledge, the global social cost
of emitting CO2 is likely to be in the range
10–100 euros/tonCO2. A more exact figure requires
value judgments on how to value the welfare of
future generations and greater knowledge of cli-
mate change and its consequences. Implementing
measures so that these costs are internalised is not
likely to have a dramatic effect on the economy.
However, poorly-constructed policy can easily lead
to much higher costs, as well as smaller effects on
climate change. A comprehensive climate policy
for all EU member states is therefore necessary.
￿ It is essential that policies are based on the one-
price principle. This principle states that the cost of
reducing emissions by one unit should be the same
regardless of how and where this is done. Policies
that deviate from this like feed-in tariffs that make
it several times more valuable to reduce emissions
via solar panels on private houses than, for exam-
ple, to use large offshore wind power farms, are
very costly and hinder the technological develop-
ment that could make us less fossil fuel dependent.
Learning externalities may differ between different
technologies, but are not large enough to motivate
any substantially different treatment of them.
Both different technologies and mitigation efforts,
however, are currently treated inconsistently by
individual EU member states. The European
Union should swiftly harmonise these policies. A
first and simple step would be to introduce a com-
mon CO2 tax. 
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